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Form, Function, and Justiciability
Anthony J. Bellia Jr.*
In A Theory of Justiciability,' Professor Jonathan Siegel provides an

insightful functional analysis of justiciability doctrines.
He well
demonstrates that justiciability doctrines are ill suited to serve certain
purposes-for example, ensuring that litigants have adverse interests in
disputes that federal courts hear. Professor Siegel proceeds to identify what
he believes to be one plausible purpose of justiciability doctrines: to enable
Congress to decide when individuals with "abstract" (or "undifferentiated") 2
injuries may use federal courts to require that federal law be enforced.
Ultimately, he rejects this justification because (1) congressional power to
create justiciability where it would not otherwise exist proves that
justiciability is not a real limit on federal judicial power, and (2) Congress
should not have authority to determine when constitutional provisions are
judicially enforceable because Congress could thereby control enforcement
of constitutional limitations on its own authority. Thus, he rejects a "private
rights" model of federal court adjudication and concludes that federal courts
have power to act so long as they are passing on the legality, not the wisdom,
of political decisions.
I am delighted to have the opportunity to comment on this
characteristically thoughtful and insightful article by Professor Siegel. In this
brief Comment, I consider Professor Siegel's argument that congressional
power to generate justiciability demonstrates the purposelessness of
justiciability doctrines. First, I question whether congressional power to
generate justiciability demonstrates that justiciability is an ineffective limit
on federal power. Insofar as lawmaking procedures limit congressional
power to act, congressional rather than judicial power to generate
justiciability where it would not otherwise exist may demonstrate the very
limits of justiciability. If indeed justiciability is an effective limit on federal
power, I question whether Professor Siegel ultimately should dismiss as a
justification for justiciability doctrines the one plausible purpose he
identifies: justiciability doctrines afford Congress control over judicial
enforcement of federal law, the violation of which, absent congressional
action, causes only undifferentiated or abstract injury.

* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory ofJusticiability,86 TEXAS L. REv. 73 (2007).
2. In FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), the Court described a "generalized grievance"
insufficient for standing as an "abstract" as opposed to "concrete" injury. Id. at 24-25. In dissent,
Justice Scalia argued that this characterization of a "generalized grievance" overlooked the
requirement that, for standing, a plaintiff must assert a "particularized" as opposed to
"undifferentiated" injury. Id. at 35-36 (Scalia, J.. dissenting).
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To begin, it is well worth endorsing Professor Siegel's point that federal
courts perform the important function of enforcing federal law. It would be
wrong to view the dispute-resolution role of federal courts as inconsistent
with their role in enforcing federal law. Given a federal judicial authority to
enforce federal laws, one must confront the question of what, if any,
limitations exist on that authority. Each branch of the federal government
has limits on its authority to act. The central function of Congress is to make
federal laws.
But, as Professor Siegel highlights, bicameralism and
presentment limit, if not define, the ability of Congress to perform that
function (as do the enumeration of powers in Article I and the Bill of Rights).
If a function of federal courts is to enforce federal laws, does the Constitution
limit, if not define, their ability to perform that function?
The Supreme Court has long recognized constitutional limits on the
authority of federal courts to enforce federal laws. A federal court generally
may not exercise jurisdiction, including "arising under" jurisdiction, unless
Congress properly authorizes it to do so. Moreover, a federal court may not
exercise jurisdiction, including "arising under" jurisdiction, unless a case is
"justiciable"-this, of course, is the limitation that Professor Siegel's article
evaluates.
Professor Siegel recognizes that constraining the power of a federal
institution to act can be a legitimate constitutional purpose in itself.3 He
argues, however, that one should not discern such a constraint if it is merely
"cosmetic or illusory."4 In other words, one should not find that the
Constitution renders government action difficult if "the difficulty would be
so easily overcome as to amount to no difficulty at all." 5 For example, he
explains that it would be wrong to claim that the Constitution forbids the
President from signing bills on Sunday simply because a no-Sunday-signing
practice (1) has a textual recognition, (2) comports with preconstitutional
practice, (3) would likely have been expected by the Framers to continue in
practice after the Constitution was ratified, (4) indeed did so continue, and
(5) would act as a constraint on federal power if not merely a practice but a
prohibition. One reason it would be wrong, he explains, is that the President
could overcome the limit by signing the bill on Monday. A limitation so
purposeless can be no limit at all.
Assume that "no Sunday signings" would be a purposeless
constitutional limitation. Are justiciability doctrines of the same ilk? Like
the no-Sunday-signing practice, the forms and modes of proceeding that
limited the ability of courts to hear cases constituted a practice that existed
both pre- and post-ratification and that those knowledgeable in law would
have expected to continue.
This alone, Professor Siegel argues, is
insufficient to demonstrate that a historical practice is a constitutionally
3. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 83.
4. Id. at 85.
5. Id. at 84.
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limiting practice. There may be, however, one salient historical difference
between the forms that limited judicial power and the no-Sunday-signing
practice. There is specific evidence that persons knowledgeable in law
reasonably understood the limitations on judicial power to function as
constitutionallimitations. At the Federal Convention, when William Samuel
Johnson moved to extend federal court jurisdiction to cases arising under the
Constitution, James Madison apparently expressed concern:
Mr Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to extend the
jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising Under the
Constitution, & whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a
Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the Constitution in cases
not of this nature ought not to be given to that Department.6
Johnson's motion passed on the understanding that federal court jurisdiction
was limited to certain kinds of cases:
The Motion of Docr. Johnson was agreed to nem: con: it being
generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively
limited to cases of a Judiciary natureIn other words, it was "generally supposed" that federal courts would
expound the Constitution only in exercising a uniquely judicial function. In a
reflective letter to Thomas Jefferson in 1823, Madison explained that a
federal court would ensure the enforcement and supremacy of federal law
only in "cases resulting to [a federal court] in the exercise of its functions."
These statements express an understanding that the nature of cases within the
judicial function limited the ability of federal courts to enforce federal law.
The Marshall Court, in recognizing the importance of federal courts in
federal law enforcement, also recognized that the words "case" or
"controversy" in Article III imported some "justiciability" limitations on
federal courts. In Cohens v. Virginia,9 Marshall explained:
[Article 111] does not extend the judicial power to every violation of
the constitution which may possibly take place, but to "a case in law
or equity," in which a right, under such law, is asserted in a Court of
justice. If the question cannot be brought into a Court, then there is no
case in law or equity, and no jurisdiction is given by the words of the
article. 10

6. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.

1966).
7. Id.
8. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823), in 4 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 83-84.

9. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
10. Id. at 405.
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In Osborn v. United States,'' Marshall explained that the judicial power "is
capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it by a party who
asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law. It then becomes a case."l 2
That said, the forms in which federal courts hear "cases" have evolved
dramatically since the Constitution was ratified.
The enterprise of
generalizing limitations on judicial power from the forms that limited the
judicial power in the eighteenth century is fraught with difficulties.13 The
point here is simply that there is evidence that those knowledgeable in law
and the Constitution specifically understood at the time of ratification and in
subsequent decades that certain forms limited the power of federal courts to
enforce federal law. In this, it seems, lies a distinction between justiciability
and the no-Sunday-signing law.
Professor Siegel, of course, is concerned less with historical
considerations than with functional ones. As a functional matter, he
concludes that there is only one plausible purpose of justiciability limits: "to
empower Congress to control whether courts should entertain public actions
to enforce legal constraints in situations that current law does not view as
imposing individualized harms." 14 He ultimately rejects this purpose for two
reasons.
First, he claims, congressional power to eliminate justiciability
demonstrates that justiciability, like a no-Sunday-signing law, is no effective
constitutional limit at all. He explains that Congress can fashion new legal
rights, the violation of which confers standing that would not otherwise
exist." Moreover, he argues, Congress can provide "universal standing"
through qui tam actions.16 Because Congress may create standing where it
would not otherwise exist, Professor Siegel contends, justiciability doctrines
are not a real limit on judicial action: "the doctrines really do nothing to the
extent that they attempt to resist the power of Congress to authorize judicial
review, and so to that extent they should be discarded." 17
One might draw an alternative conclusion from the congressional
control that exists over justiciability: rather than demonstrate that
justiciability is an illusory limit on judicial power, congressional rather than
judicial control demonstrates the very reality of justiciability as a limit on
judicial power. The Executive is no less limited in authority to seek

11. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
12. Id. at 819.
13. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article II1 and the Cause ofAction, 89 IOWA L. REv. 777. 817-32
(2004).
14. Siegel, supra note 1, at 127.
15. Id at 105. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), the Court explained that
its rejection of standing in that case did not "contradict[] the principle that [t]he . . . injury required
by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing." Id. at 578 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Siegel, supra note 1, at 105-06.
17. Id. at 107.
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indictments for crimes that Congress has not enacted by the fact that
Congress has power to enact them than courts are in hearing nonjusticiable
cases by the fact that Congress might render them justiciable. Congress
might enact an omnibus standing bill using either of the devices that
Professor Siegel identifies. It is telling, though, that Congress has not. For
Congress to act, it must overcome the procedural and political hurdles that
stand as a real obstacle to congressional lawmaking. Congressional action is
itself difficult, and absent it, justiciability limits are real limits on federal
judicial power to act.
Professor Siegel's rejection of congressional control over the
justiciability of abstract or undifferentiated injuries does not rest simply on
the claim that justiciability limits are no limits at all.
He rejects
congressional control as a purpose for the additional reason "that it would
leave enforcement of the affected constitutional provisions in the hands of
the very actors whom those provisions constrain, thereby draining those
provisions of any purpose."" This claim has implications for congressional
control of federal courts more generally. Judges and federal courts scholars
have long struggled with the question of what power Congress has to limit
federal court jurisdiction, especially where constitutional rights are at stake.
Judges and scholars have also struggled with the question of what powers
Congress and courts respectively have to provide remedies for the violation
of constitutional provisions that do not themselves provide them. To the
extent that the Bill of Rights constrains Congress, Professor Siegel's thesis
may have implications for both of these sets of important questions.
Professor Siegel's claim that Congress should not control judicial
enforcement of constitutional limitations on Congress should spawn further
scholarship, especially in light of its broad implications. In debates over the
merits of functional versus formal legal analysis, an important but
fundamental idea is sometimes lost: behind form typically lies function. It is
not lost on Professor Siegel, of course, as he recognizes this very point at the
outset of this article. He explains that "some constitutional provisions
importantly contribute to good governmental structure by limiting the federal
government's power and by making that power difficult to exercise." 9 More
specifically, Professor Siegel quotes the Supreme Court as explaining that
these limits "preserve freedom by making the exercise of power subject to
the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution." 20 He rejects
any such justification for standing because he does not view standing as a
real limit on government authority. If one accepts, however, that it is a real
limit, one finds oneself at the center of a fundamental separation-of-powers
debate over the respective roles of Congress and the federal courts that has
played out for decades.
18. Id at 128.
19. Id at 81.
20. Id at 82 (quoting TNS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)).
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Under a functional analysis, the formal rules of standing strike a
balance. If a plaintiff demonstrates a concrete and particularized injury, the
plaintiff may pursue a remedy. The functional benefit to recovery is that the
plaintiff receives redress for a legal violation. The functional detriments are
that (1) the Court might overreach and afford a remedy not required by law,
and (2) the Court might require Executive action and expenditure in tension
or at odds with competing priorities that might also well serve human needs.
(If justiciability is a real limit on judicial power, contrary to Professor
Siegel's suggestion, these are identifiable detriments.) Notwithstanding
these detriments, the Supreme Court has read the Constitution in such a way
as to tip the balance in favor of redress where the plaintiff has suffered a
concrete injury. If, however, a plaintiff presents only an abstract (or
undifferentiated) injury, the plaintiff may not pursue a remedy. The
functional detriment is that the Court cannot rule in favor of a law being
enforced. The functional benefits are that (1) the Court, since it cannot rule,
will not overreach and require enforcement not warranted by law, and (2) the
Court will not order Executive action and expenditure in tension or at odds
with competing priorities that might well serve other human needs. The
Supreme Court has read the Constitution in such a way as to tip the balance
against redress where the plaintiff claims to suffer only in an abstract or
undifferentiated way.
In either instance, the benefits of enforcing plaintiffs' claims are
palpable and, in some measure, quantifiable; the benefits of nonenforcement
are more removed from our senses and less easily quantified. In a functional
analysis, the question thus arises of who should strike the benefit-detriment
balance between enforcement and nonenforcement: Congress or federal
courts? Given the circularity of checks and balances, the tension between (1)
the benefits of on-demand legal enforcement and (2) the benefits of limited
government is evident in this context.
It should come as no surprise that Professor Siegel's work brings us, in
the end, to fundamental questions that have defined the field of federal
courts. It is a testament to the functional insights of his article.

